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Abstract 
This paper is a part of a wider research on European taxation, carried out in this Department, under the 
direction of L. Bernardi and P. Profeta, and the supervision of. V. Tanzi. The paper tries to evaluate 
whether recent European tax reforms have really been suitable for to-day fundamental needs of 
Europe. Almost all of such reforms have been narrow in size and often conflicting in scope. The re-
sults were therefore not very impressive. Historically diverse, European tax systems did not converge 
as it would be required for the efficiency of the single market. Furthermore, a primary weight must be 
due to the long lasting decline of European growth rates. A recovery requires (amongst many other 
things) for taxation to be substantially reduced on labor and corporations. This is not an easy task. In-
creased fiscal and social fairness could however sustain welfare, by matching growth decrease. Finally 
tax reforms should be aware of the incoming European Constitution and EU moves to an increasingly 
Federal state. They should therefore copy with a careful reallocation of powers and financing among 
the new government tiers. They finally should provide for a basic common level of social protection 
within European countries (and those soon join the Union). 
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Politics is a slow and strenuous overcoming of hard 
 difficulties ( but ) the possible would never be achieved if 
 in the world the impossible had not always been tried again. 
 
                                                
MAX WEBER, 1919m 
 
1. Introduction∗ 
 
From the early 1990s near all the European Countries’ tax systems were subject to a lot of 
changes. Many others are currently under way or in the planning stages (for the details see 
Gandullia 2003 and Joumard 2001). The forces which shaped the reforms were several (e.g. 
Tanzi 2003) and often conflicting. Fiscal systems were requested to raise revenue, in order to 
fulfill the Maastrich requirements and then of the Stability Pact (e.g. De Novellis and Parlato 
2003). A reduction of fiscal pressure was also called for to boost declining growth and em-
ployment. To sustain this proposal a recurring argument was the comparison with the US 
whose growth was higher but taxes very lower. Fiscal competition in an increasingly inte-
grated world affected tax rates and structures of the most mobile bases. Common opinions 
called on for more efficiency, thus stressing the need for making taxes more simple and neu-
tral. Political factors however, i.e. the pressure of lobby groups (Profeta 2003), prevented this 
process from going very far. 
The same constraints were at odds with the most radical proposals of fiscal reforms. 
These proposals were thus fated from the outset, possibly lacking electoral support (but also 
budget means). As it usually happens, a grater degree of fairness was invoked but on the con-
trary income tax top rates almost anywhere were reduced. The unavoidable result so far has 
been a difficult mix of tax cuts and tax increases, reiterate shifts of tax sources and continuous 
minor tax codes updates. As a bottom line, a further consequence could not be avoided. Most 
1990s European Countries’ tax changes were namely narrow in size and limited in scope, i.e. 
“marginal” in Optimal Taxation (OT) language. 
 
m Polik als Beruft, Wissenschaft als Beruft. 
 
∗ M.C. Guerra, with M. Bernasconi, R. Puglisi and A. Zanardi, gave me an invaluable contribute of careful read-
ing, sharp comments and stimulating suggestions. I have also to thank for helps of various kind the Co-Authors 
of the research, G. Arachi, C. Bronchi, I. Joumard, A. Majocchi, F. Osculati and W. Oates. This paper is part of a 
research concerning “The European tax system: trends and issues”, fostered by Italian Ministry of Education, 
University and Scientific Research as “Scientific research programs of national interest - fiscal year 2002”. Fi-
nancings also from the Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde and the Fondazione Banca 
del Monte di Lombardia are gratefully acknowledged. 
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Are these really the most suitable fiscal reforms for the fundamental, present needs of 
European Countries? My answer is quite negative. The most authoritative views, including 
the main International organizations (e.g. EU Commission 2000; Joumard 2001) stress the ur-
gent need to make taxation more supply-friendly, by taking off labor and productive capital to 
some extent. The burden should be shifted on consumption, immovable properties and envi-
ronment externalities whereas heavy losses on revenues from capital incomes should be 
avoided. The basic features of main national taxes should be brought closer, to make the 
overall “European” tax system more neutral and efficient. The working of the single market 
would be thus improved. 
These suggestions are sure enough well founded on qualitative grounds, but the true ques-
tion simply and suddenly arises: how much and how far? Such question comes from three 
current key factors which heavily impinge on European tax systems and any future changes 
hoped for: 
(i) several years of tax competition and harmonization efforts have failed up to now to set 
out a basic common framework for an “European” tax system. We mean a system suitable for 
the mixed “Confederation”-to-“Federation” to-day EU institutional setting, and really ena-
bling a mobility of people, goods and capitals, within the single market and free from fiscal 
distortions; 
(ii) the European economy’s growth rate decrease seems at this point almost endless. 
Prospects for future recovery are continuously postponed. The outlook of economic decline 
cannot be excluded, even amongst the more established countries. Could fiscal reforms really 
contribute to enhancing economic growth? Furthermore, how should the tax system be shaped 
in order to keep up the level of welfare of the Pigouvian “national dividend,” by matching the 
decreasing growth rate with increased levels of fairness? 
(iii) the rebuilding of the European institutional setting is just starting out. Common his-
torical heritage of the Federal States leads to predict profound changes in allocation of gov-
ernment tiers’ taxing and spending powers. Constitutional guarantees for the satisfaction of a 
basic level of social protection is likely to be strengthened. 
The next three paragraphs of the paper are devoted to opening an intuitive discussion of 
how tax reforms should be shaped in order to be consistent with the environment just de-
picted. I am well aware that my remarks frequently may appear somewhat general and vague. 
I look at this as the due price required to afford and not to evade the largest and fundamental 
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topics we have to copy with and not to continue instead going on with endless debates about 
minute (if not irrelevant at all) issues. Thus, last paragraph reports my preliminary main con-
clusions but also stresses the need of further research efforts devoted to pinpoint fiscal re-
forms best suitable for Europe essential needs. 
 
 
2. The missing common basic framework of the European tax systems 
 
2.1. The survival of countries’ tax-clusters 
 
At the early of the 1970s, European1 Countries were almost all mid-to-high fiscal pressure 
countries. The total figure (taxes and social contributions) was about 33 per cent of GDP,2 and 
was already over that of both the US (about 27 per cent) and Japan (still at about 22 per cent) 
(EU Commission 2000; Eurostat 2000; OECD 2001). This book’s selected countries were 
more or less close to the continental average, the only relevant exceptions being the then low 
taxing Italy (27.5 per cent) and even more, Spain (25.6 per cent). The picture looks quite dif-
ferent by splitting overall pressure into its main headings. A wide dispersion emerges among 
direct taxes and social contributions from country to country (see Table 1). Countries’ indirect 
taxes (then prevailing on direct ones’) were closer to the average figure. By combining these 
differences, four countries’ tax-clusters3 come out, going back to the Europe historical, eco-
nomic and institutional roots. 
(i) Nordic Countries:4 the fiscal pressure was very high. It was made up in large amount 
by direct and (at lesser size) indirect taxes, to pay for a comprehensive and advanced welfare 
state. 
(ii) Rhine Countries: the fiscal pressure was somewhat higher than the European average. 
Direct taxes prevailed in some countries, indirect ones’ elsewhere. Anywhere however, social 
                                                 
1 EU 9 up to 1979 and EU 15 thereafter. 
 
2 Gandullia (2003) gives more details on the structures of European tax systems during last decades. 
 
3 Such clusters aren’t just a convenient paradigm. The estimated correlation coefficients (country data sets of Ta-
ble 1) generally are in line with the values expected according to the tax-clusters’ hypothesis both for 1970 and 
1997 (data not reported here and available from the Author). 
 
4 Nordic Countries have not been considered in this book, both for their marginality with respect to the Euro-area 
and for their economic and social peculiarities. 
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contributions raised a high size, in order to financing a well generous Bismarckian welfare 
state. 
(iii) Anglo-Saxon Countries: the fiscal pressure was still close to the European average. 
Taxes’ share was largely over that of social contributions. The public health service was paid 
out from general tax revenues. The public Beveridgean pension schemes were tightened to 
dispense just low-amount social security treatments. 
(iv) Mediterranean Countries: the development’s delay kept total fiscal pressure at a still 
low level. Tax systems had social contributions close to the European average. Taxes (espe-
cially direct ones’) still stood well below European standards. 
European fiscal pressure anywhere increased from the early 1970s to the late 1990s (see Table 
1), apart from in Ireland and in the United Kingdom.5 It was pulled up (six points) by a grow-
ing social expenditure essentially during the 1970s (Eurostat 2000; van den Noord and Heady 
2001) and a final Maastricht queue (1.8 per cent in the 1990s). The current total average fig-
ure thus rose to more than 42 per cent of GDP in 2000, thus leaving well behind both that of 
Japan (increased to 27.9 per cent) and of the US (near kept still at 28.3 per cent). After the 
mythic peak of 1997, just some minor and scattered tax cuts were adopted.6 The questionable 
forces of Stability Pact were and continue to be at work, forcing European Member  Countries  
to  keep  up  fiscal  pressure  (e.g. De  Novellis  and Parlato 2003). 
The wide tax levels’ dispersion among countries, already apparent at the early of the 
1970s, essentially continued to hold firm. The growth of direct taxes and social contributions 
was however very fast, whereas the profile of indirect taxes on the contrary was almost flat. 
The main features of tax-clusters did not generally undergo dramatic changes. The shift to the 
“Dual Income Tax System” (Soerensen 1994) did not significantly change the fiscal structure 
of Nordic Countries. In the Rhine area, fiscal pressure grew yet more. Personal income tax 
jumped up and social contributions effected a further upward turn. The Anglo-Saxon  
 
 
                                                 
5 Do not forget to be careful when compare international fiscal data sets, mainly when welfare provisions and fi-
nancing show different institutional arrangements. One should take account, inter alia, of the spread between 
gross and net social expenditure and of fiscal pressure’s reduction due to the existing tax expenditures (Adema 
2001). Eurostat 2002 data suggest that total (public+ private) welfare demand and supply is very close to a 
common figure within European Countries. 
 
6 Among our selected countries, Italy, The Netherlands and, at a very low extent, Germany and Ireland, reduced 
total fiscal pressure up to 2001, the remaining three did not cut or increased their taxes (OECD 2002a). 
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Table 1 Structure and development of fiscal revenues in European Countries as % of GDP, 1970-1997. 
   1970 1997 
    D E F         
                 
IRL IT NL UK EU D E F IRL IT NL UK EU 
Direct Taxes 10.9 7.1 7.3 9.4 5.3 12.9 17.4 8.9 10.1 11.9 11.3 14.7 16.5 13.4 15.6 13.7
Personal income                 
                 
       
                 
                
                 
      
          
      
           
                
                 
                 
       
          
       
                
               
                 
        
8.2 4.8 4.4 7.0 0.1 9.7 11.1 5.5 7.8 8.3 8.1 10.4 9.6 6.8 9.3 9.3
Corporation income 1.7
 
1.2
 
2.1
 
1.5
 
2.4 3.0 2.9 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.2 3.7 4.3 4.6 4.3 3.0
       
Indirect taxes
 
13.2 6.6 15.0 19.4 10.5 10.9 14.2 13.0 12.7 10.9 15.8 14.8 12.7 13.5 14.6 13.9
VAT 5.9 0.0 8.9 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 5.1 6.6 5.8 7.9 7.3 5.7 7.0 7.1 7.0
Excise duties 3.4
 
1.5
 
2.9
 
10.2
 
4.9 3.0 6.6 3.5 2.9 3.0 3.0 5.1 4.0 3.4 4.0 3.5
        
TOTAL TAXES  24.1 
 
13.7 
 
22.3 
 
28.8 
 
15.8 23.8 31.6 21.9 22.8 22.8 27.1 29.5 29.2 26.9 30.2 27.6
        
Social contributions 
 
11.6 11.8 12.7 2.8 11.7 13.5 5.6 11.7 19.0 12.8 19.2 4.5 14.9 18.9 7.0 15.0
Employers 5.4 9.3 9.3 1.4 7.9 6.1 2.8 7.2 8.2 8.9 12.2 2.8 10.3 3.6 3.7 8.2
Employees 4.9 1.9 2.4 1.3 1.7 5.7 2.6 3.5 7.2 2.24 5.6 1.5 2.9 11.9 3.1 5.0
Self employed 1.4
 
0.7
 
1.0
 
0.0
 
0.4
 
16.5
 
0.2
 
1.0
  
3.6 1.7 1.6 0.2 1.7 3.7 0.2 1.9
  
TOTAL  REVENUES 35.7 
 
25.6 
 
35.1 
 
34.7 
 
27.5 
 
36.0 
 
36.9
 
33.5
  
41.8 35.5 46.6 34.0 44.1 45.8 37.2 42.1
  
Administrative level 
 Central government 95.9 94.9 96.5 96.0 97.8 99.4 95.5 96.4 94.7 89.3 4.6 95.2 94.4 96.5 98.2 95.8
Local governments 4.1 5.1 3.5 4.0 2.2 0.6 4.5 3.6 5.3 10.7
 
5.4
 
4.8
 
5.6
 
3.5
 
1.8
 
4.2
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2000). 
Notes:   Minor items are omitted. EU 9 up to 1979, EU 15 thereafter. Local revenues do not include sharing to national taxes. Data stop at 1997 to be consistent with those of Table 
.             2, not available for subsequent years. 
 
 
 Countries were left at the starting post: fiscal pressure did not increase, nor was its structure 
dramatically changed. Med club countries marked the main change. The total fiscal pressure 
of the European development newcomers7 increased by about 10-15 points. Tax structure 
changed markedly in favor of direct (in Spain also indirect) taxes. 
 
 
2.2. Not enough convergence and narrow reforms: macro and micro issues 
 
Table 2 shows a set of macro-indicators pertaining to tax systems’ convergence in our se-
lected countries, going from 1970 to 1997. As to the simple ratios to GDP, the convergence 
processes (by competition or harmonization) seem to have impinged upon direct8 and still 
more indirect taxes.9 Neither total taxes nor social contributions show clear signals of conver-
gence. What about tax burden? An analysis by economic functions (i.e. main aggregates of in-
ternal resources or employments, Eurostat 2000) as ratio to their overall value (more or less 
the GDP), points out strong evidences of convergence for consumption and far lower for capi-
tal (be aware that “capital” here means all the heterogeneous incomes which constitute operat-
ing surplus in national accounting). Convergence for labor and total fiscal burden seem to 
have been almost not existing at all. However different degrees of tax base buoyancy rather 
muddy such evidence, thus calling for a closer look at the movement of tax structure as de-
picted by the implicit rates (i.e. the revenues on single factor or employment as a ratio of a na-
tional accounts potential tax basis: Martinez-Mongay 2000). Taxation on labor increased by 
almost 50 per cent and at the same time diverged, heterogeneous capital was affected by a 
stable rate converging taxation, while for consumption it remained much the 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Italy adopted a fundamental tax reform in 1972, Spain not many years after (see Italy’s and Spain’s chapters). 
 
8 This has been mainly due to the income tax, whose amount is largely prevailing inside this category. See below 
for corporate and capital incomes taxes. 
9 Do not forget that in 1970 a true income tax was still not in existence in many European Countries and VAT 
was in force only in France. 
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 Table 2 Descriptive statistics of fiscal systems in selected European Countries 1970-1997 
  
PER CENT OF GDP ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS IMPLICIT RATES 
1970   
 
           
           
           
           
           
           
   
     
           
           
           
           
           
           
      
1970
 
1970
  TOTAL DIRECT INDIRECT  CONTRIB. LABOR CAPITAL CONSUM.. TOTAL LABOR CAPITAL CONSUM. 
Max. Value 36.9 17.4 19.4 13.5 18.9 11.8 16.0 37.2 34.2 55.4 21.1
Min. Value 25.6 5.3 6.6 2.8 8.4 4.7 5.3 25.6 16.1 16.6 7.3
Mean 33.3 10.0 12.8 10.0 13.9 6.3 10.7 32.6 26.6 29.2 16.1
St. Dev. 4.7 4.0 4.1 4.1 3.6 2.5 3.2 5.1 6.2 13.4 4.6
(Max-Min)/Mean % 33.9 121.0 100.0 107.0 75.4 112.4 100.3 35.5 68.0 132.9 85.9
SD/ Mean % 14.1 40.0 32.0 41.0 26.0 39.5 30.4 15.6 23.1 45.8 28.4
1997 1997
 
1997
  TOTAL DIRECT INDIRECT  CONTRIB. LABOR CAPITAL CONSUM. TOTAL LABOR CAPITAL CONSUM.
Max. Value 46.6 16.5 15.8 19.0 23.9 10.0 12.9 46.4 50.7 42.1 23.7
Min. Value 34.0 10.1 10.9 4.5 12.9 4.0 9.8 34.0 26.5 20.5 15.7
Mean 40.6 13.4 13.6 13.8 19.4 7.9 11.3 40.7 39.7 30.7 18.8
St. Dev. 5.3 2.4 1.6 6.0 4.6 2.0 1.1 5.1 9.3 7.4 3.5
(Max-Min)/Mean % 31.0 47.8 36.0 105.1 56.6 75.9 27.4 30.5 61.0 70.3 42.6
SD/ Mean % 13.1 17.9 11.8 43.5 23.5 25.9 9.9 12.5 30.2 18.6 18.6
 
Sources: Data and our computations from Eurostat, 2000. Countries as in Table 1. 
            
            
 
same story as before.  
It looks to me quite impossible to claim that today EU10 is working well and pursuing its 
declared aims, those being the status and the trends of its Member Countries’ fiscal systems. 
Is it really possible to strengthen the single market, particularly as to the free movement of 
goods, people and capitals without fiscal interference, when max-min values of fiscal pres-
sure, sorted by type of tax or their burden diverge by two digit figures? Notice further that the 
only process of convergence under way to this day seems have been due to the growth of the 
income tax, the harmonization of VAT and some tax competition on the most mobile capital. 
Again, the main and bad final result has been an increase of near 50 per cent in the labor aver-
age tax wedge during long years of declining growth and increasing unemployment. 
The unavoidable flip side of the coin is that only wide reforms can correct such widely 
varying tax systems and structural differences and to substitute inefficient existing processes 
of tax competition and harmonization. These were not however the reforms pursued by many 
European Countries during the 1990s, which essentially brought about some simplifying and 
rationalizing effects of the existing systems, together with a lot of other minor changes (Gan-
dullia 2003), but sometimes did not improve many already critical situations at all. Let us ex-
plore some of the main cases. 
 (i) Corporate Tax – It is commonly recognized that from the 1980s onwards corpora-
tions’ statutory “all-in” tax rates decreased markedly, by about 15 points (from less than 47 to 
near 32 per cent in the EU average during the years 1980-2003-forecast figure) (Cnossen 
2002). This has been commonly attributed to a greater fiscal competition, which in turn would 
result highly correlated with the increasing degree of globalization and capital mobility 
(Bretschger and Hettick 2002). The tax burden decrease was empirically confirmed for the ex 
ante but not the ex post effective rates. This trend of implicit (= effective ex post) rates is also 
due to the broadening of the bases that usually matched rates cuts (Devereux, Griffith and 
Klemm 2001). The final result might have been of no-incentive-investments reforms, as is 
suspected by Keen (2002) for the much vaunted German case and its planned Italian mirror 
opposite (Bernardi 2002b). If I am right, Keen’s fine analysis of the German 2000 tax reform 
also hints between the lines at the fact that at least one reason for the alleged simplification 
                                                 
10 EU may be now seen as an institution which falls between a “Confederation” and a ”Federation.” According to 
the common language of political philosophy, “Federation” means that the center and the states are coordinate 
and independent. The center is instead subordinate to the states in a “Confederation” (quotation in Cnossen 
2002). 
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adopted (= participation exemption and end of the imputation system) has been also a reaction 
to the difficulties in coping with elusive practices and harmful competition. 
(ii) Financial capital incomes – The original Razin and Sadka prophecy (1991) of this tax 
basis progressive vanishing has proved to be untrue without full mobility of assets and within 
imperfect capital markets. Inside EU Countries tax rates on interest unambiguously decreased 
during the last decade by about ten points (from nearly 46 per cent in 1990 to slightly less 
than 37 per cent in 2000), but this has been mainly due to the substitution of final withhold-
ings for the inclusion in the income tax basis. The reduction of dividend rates was far less and 
statistically insignificant. The whole system of income capital taxation has diverged and be-
come less neutral (Gorter and de Mooj 2001). Inside the large majority of countries the shift 
to low rate withholdings on interest enlarged a distortional spread with dividends taxation.11 
National models of interest taxation became more uneven (Joumard 2001; van de Noord and 
Heady 2001). Partial (Luxembourg, United Kingdom, The Netherlands) or total (Denmark, 
Germany, Spain, Ireland) inclusion in the income tax basis at marginal rates of up to 60 per 
cent are in force as well as final withholdings (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Greece, It-
aly, Portugal, Sweden) at rates going from 12.5 per cent (Italy) to 30 per cent (Finland and 
Sweden). Up to mid January 2003 non residents were generally exempt even if this was not 
formally the case in Greece and Portugal. The EU agreement of 21 January 2003 is based 
mainly on monitoring and information exchanges to allow taxation in the country of residence 
(except for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg). The adopted solution is well informed to the 
better residence principle (vs. that of origin). It results however are somewhat deprived by the 
increasing exclusion of total interest income from progressive income tax base just over seen. 
Further one must hope that monitoring and information exchanges will be effective and really 
cooperative. Needless to say tax regimes for dividends and capital gains are still more frag-
mented than for interests. The same claimed “general” shift away from the imputation system 
(whatever its very doubtful merits) up to now has been realized by a minority of European 
Countries (van de Noord and Heady 2001). For income capital taxation these are the poor re-
sults of tax competition on the most mobile bases. 
(iii) Social contributions and income tax – At the early 1990s the European average tax 
wedge on labor was already at about 50 per cent. The implicit rate was at 35 per cent, some 
                                                 
11This bad result somehow could be avoided by adopting a “true” “Dual income tax system” which should tax 
any kind of capital income at the same rate. As to 1998 this solution was however not yet adopted by all the 
same Nordic Countries (van de Noord and Heady 2001).  
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ten points above the US level (EU Commission 2000; Cnossen 2002). Inescapable was the 
conjecture that this had something to do with the different pattern of growth and employment 
then observed in the two areas. The suggestion to remove tax on labor, particularly non 
skilled labor, was obvious, it was first put forward by the authoritative voices of Drèze and 
Malinvaud (1994) and thereafter repeatedly raised both by the OECD and also by the UE 
Commission: it became mandatory for the Union Member States at the Lisbona’s Council of 
2000. 
What has really been achieved? From 1990 to 2000 the implicit rate was increased by 
about two further points, equally distributed between social contributions and income tax 
(Martines-Mongay 2000). As to social contributions just small cuts were introduced, by no 
more than a few points, generally only at the lower end of the wage scale and not in all Euro-
pean Countries (Gandullia 2003 and EU Commission 2000). 
Tax cuts of the income tax were similar (still Gandullia 2003 and EU Commission 2000), 
but usually they were extended also to the top rate, sometimes in quite a reasonable way 
(Germany and France for example), in other cases they were planned by a provocative heavy 
amount (Italy). The burden for the (most dense) central income classes kept usually relatively 
unchanged. The total redistributive12 effect thus has not generally been particularly relevant. 
The enlargement of the no-tax area was certainly welcome, mostly as much as producing 
higher equity, incentives on the labor supply being instead so minute as to be in fact uncertain 
(see Gandullia 2003 and next paragraph). Unfortunately the price paid for the prevailing way 
adopted to put into operation this cut13 was a large increase of marginal rates over the no-tax 
area. To (partially) correct this effect new decreasing deductions had to be introduced, going 
further to complicate a tax structure that any committed country would seek to simplify. Fur-
thermore the no-tax area should have been enlarged up to a threshold able to cover the equiva-
lent household level of poverty, what has rarely been achieved especially as more numerous 
was the households, i.e. by adopting a poor equivalence scale. 
The reduction of top rates, very difficult to explain on the grounds of efficiency (the mo-
bility of the highly skilled and their tax “dissatisfaction” have been alleged) is not easy to be 
                                                 
12 Measured as usually by the difference between the Gini’s index of pre- and post- tax incomes. 
 
13 Though an enlargement of deduction at the bottom scale, combined with reducing and flattening the rates. 
With respect to a more graduated rates schedule, this technique has the political advantage of an apparent greater 
visibility, but it implies the (not easy to be perceived) distortion in the equity and efficiency mentioned in the 
text. Then we are in front of a school case of lacking fairness in tax laws (see below, par. 4.2). 
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understood on political economy grounds either (Profeta 2003). The beneficiaries are few 
(usually not more than ten per cent of voters) and supposedly already in favor of the right-
wing governments which made the job. One is thus forced to see this change as an ideological 
signal consistent with the various currents of though which e.g. from Locke to Nozik and Bu-
chanan allege the existing of some “natural” or “implicit constitutional” limits to the power to 
tax. This stream of thinking about fiscal and social justice is however very questionable (e.g. 
Bernardi 2002a) and certainly not new. It has been revived by the recent diffusion of right-
wing ideas and governments. As usual, some economists tried to refresh an old idea, whose 
essence dates back to Aristotle (5th century B.C.).14 
Horizontal equity was, as ever, largely forgotten and usually did not cross the traditional 
border of adjustments in fiscal treatment of household or of different kinds of workers (Gan-
dullia 2003). Within these boundaries a widespread innovation was however the more favor-
able regime granted to the aged and disabled people. The allowances for dependent parents 
also were widely augmented but the increase was substantial only in very few countries. 
Elsewhere they were dispersed among a largest number of minute benefits. The excess burden 
on single worker households remained almost anywhere under-corrected, the exception being 
the France’s well known case. 
 
 
3. Reforms to enhance growth and to strengthen fairness within European 
countries 
 
3.1. Reforms to enhance growth 
 
When fiscal burden began to increase, public finance scientists became worried about its pos-
sible negative effects on growth. The first 1927 pioneering inquiry by the Colwyn Committee 
(Steve 1976) was however reassuring, at least regarding to labor supply. In the 1950s and 
1960s the western countries’ fast growth and declining unemployment rate pushed the topic 
                                                 
14 We here are making reference to the diffuse “entitlement based view” criterion of social justice, particularly 
when the latter is combined with social mobility, also referred to as equality of opportunity. In such a case some 
even argue that inequality in income due to differences in ability, talent and hard work, might not only be con-
sidered as a factor not to be compensated for, but may also be viewed as positive good (see e. g. Johnson and 
Reed 1996), among other things implying that the support for redistribution should be lower (Benabou and Ok 
2001). 
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on one side. The same Musgrave’s “Theory” reflects this feeling. 1970s supply siders and OT 
theorists brought the topic to light once more. Making tax systems supply friendly, by reduc-
ing rates and broadening bases, became thus the “buzz” word of the tax reformers of the 
1980s, but the results were not as positive as expected (e.g. Bosworth and Burtless 1992, for 
the paramount US case). The taxation-to-growth link then became a topic of an endless dis-
cussion, maybe with just one evident robust conclusion up to now being reached. The story 
could be briefly summarized as follows. 
(i) Supply and demand of labor – Today consensus opinion is that elasticity figures differ 
from zero, but in mid range remain relatively small, albeit with some differences between la-
bor market core or marginal areas (particularly between men and married women, e.g. Blun-
dell 1992). Gross average estimate in the US case has been set around 0.1515 for total supply 
and 0.25 for demand. The more unionized European labor markets16 sure enough allow for a 
somewhat higher supply value, but how much is not clear at all (Leibfritz et al. 1997). 
(ii) Economic Theory - Neoclassical economic growth aggregate models à la Solow do 
not say very much about taxation effects, if not near the same post-Keynesian and plain com-
mon sense advise to promoting capital accumulation, i.e. taking off taxes as much as possible 
from investments and savings (at least as to their short-to-medium run effects). Endogenous 
growth models claimed to be able to provide much more robust and targeted prescriptions 
(Myles 2000). However empirical checks showed once again that the general level of average 
and marginal fiscal burden is of minimal relevance (still Myles 2000; Cassou and Lansing 
2000). Specific allowances should be allowed to physical and human capital accumulation 
(Tanzi and Zee 1997), but once more the linking figure does not seem clear-cut (Besley 
2000). Last, the so called “New theory of economic growth” stresses the need for taxes (e.g. 
Tanzi 2002; Jones 2002) and institutions (going back to North 1990) not hindering or med-
dling with economic transactions induced by the market. Up to now the list of specific pre-
scriptions is still short and selective (for taxes) or somewhat vague (for institution). 
(iii) Statistical inference - The simple checks of statistical correlation (a very poor al-
though still popular tool of analysis) between taxes and growth dates back some thirty years. 
                                                 
15 This for instance means that a tax cut which can raise net wage by ten per cent will increase labor supply just 
by 1.5 per cent. 
 
16 According to a diffused opinion, labor market institutional setting might play a greater role than the level of 
tax wedge to explain the degree of unemployment, particularly in comparison between Europe and the US (e.g. 
Blanchard 1999). 
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During all this time and throughout a long list of exercises, assuming as the maintained hy-
pothesis a negative (positive) correlation has been proved alternatively to be true, false and 
spurious, and finally also indeterminate (Agell et al., 1997). Looking at present data one can-
not however deny that some low taxes (especially labor and corporations) countries seem per-
form better, as Ireland and the United Kingdom among the Europeans. 
As before pointed out, the story has then just only relatively robust conclusion. Negative 
relationships between taxes and growth seem do exist by their size is small and they can be 
caught up just by looking at selective channels. As a consequence growth enhancing tax re-
forms should be huge in amount and strictly targeted, i.e. the opposite from the prevailing 
ones mostly adopted by the European countries in the 1990s. The difficulty to find enough 
budget backing suddenly arises. The analysis provided by De Novellis and Parlato (2003) 
makes then clear that abiding also by the present “soft” rules of the Stability Pact prevents 
almost any European Country from having the room to reduce fiscal pressure, without com-
pensating for this.17 Expenditure cuts are commonly suggested (Tanzi 2003) foreword and 
more widely Tanzi and Schuknecht 1997) and may be useful in the long run, under the condi-
tion that the welfare state is not dismantled together with its contribution to economic growth, 
social cohesion and fairness (Atkinson 1999). De Novellis and Parlato (2003) warn us how-
ever that expenditure cuts, workable in the short to medium term, must already be devoted to 
fulfilling the Stability Pact requirements. 
Wide and selective tax shifts thus become the last option to check out. The candidates are 
labor and corporate taxes to be taken off to a relevant extent. To have not just marginal effect, 
the reduction of their amounts must roughly reach near about one third for both the burdens.18 
This means in the EU average more or less one point of GDP for “all in” corporation taxes 
and near about five point of GDP in (mainly employers) social contributions (Eurostat data, 
see back Table 1). Income tax on labor should instead not to be dramatically changed for the 
reasons given at the end of this paragraph (i.e. lower contributions and more taxes in funding  
social security) and in the following one (i.e. vertical equity). On the contrary tax burden on 
consumption, rents and externalities (= environment) should become substantially heavier. 
                                                 
17 Making the Pact more rational and less binding is also suggested, by substituting debt to deficit as the target 
for budget consolidation. 
 
18 This comes for labor from the quoted elasticity figures and for corporation from international past experiences 
(e.g. Ireland) and planned reforms (e.g. Germany). 
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These two latter may produce an higher yield of about two-to-three points of GDP.19 Thus an 
increase in consumption taxes of the size of three-to-four points of GDP should be required at 
the end. It must come from VAT and not excise duties which have well more narrow bases 
and higher rates. Further notice that inflationary effects have not to be overestimated, the 
more consumption taxes substituting social contributions, i.e. an item of cost of labor at least 
in part passed on prices.20 
The main open question is instead if is it really effective to reduce tax burden on labor by 
increasing consumption taxes. The topic is controversial and highly debated in multi-faceted 
literature. Hereafter we report just three main points which together lead to the (tentative) 
conclusion that more consumption taxes may allow to alleviate those which burden on labor, 
the two being not perfect substitutes. 
(i) Theory - The traditional textbook equivalence of taxation on labor income and con-
sumption obviously still has some good arguments (e.g. Cnossen 2002), but it is increasingly 
open to question, due to its lacking empirical frame (Carone and Salomaki 2001).21 Further, 
the old proposition that heavier taxes on consumption may increase savings and investments 
still holds. Finally two central OT arguments should be reminded: first, consumption taxes do 
not change the inter-temporal consumption allocation and therefore its growth rate (Milesi-
Ferretti and Roubini 1998); second, efficiency losses would be reduced if taxation is shifted at 
a lesser rate to a wider basis. 
(ii) Econometric estimates - The last and more robust estimate has been performed by us-
ing the EU Commission’s Quest II model. As to its main result, GDP one per cent shift from 
corporate to consumption tax would move GDP by 1.6 points and wages by 2.1 points from 
                                                 
19 They could arrive from an increase of present European average to the level of the countries more taxing im-
movable property (United Kingdom, 3.5 per cent) and environment externalities (The Netherlands, 1.7 per cent) 
(Eurostat data). 
 
20 In 2000 private consumption in the Euro area amounted to 3674 billions euro at current price and to 3383 bil-
lions euro at constant (1995) prices (ECB Bulletin, 1 2003). Consequently consumption deflator was 1.086. It 
rises to 1.10 if charged by 0.7 GDP points of VAT increase, by assuming a five years planning period. The ap-
parent large inflationary impulse of 1.3 points decreases to a half if one assumes that socials contributions are al-
ready embodied in labor cost by at least 50 per cent and decreases further to something more than 0.4 points, by 
limiting VAT shifting to 75 per cent. Consider further that both the hypotheses adopted in the previous calcula-
tions are rather conservative. 
 
21 EU taxes on consumption have a basis one third higher than labor income taxes. Tax basis for capital is half 
than that for labor. 
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the average European baseline levels. The same amount of shift but from labor to consump-
tion taxes should increase employment by 0.6 and GDP by 0.7 points (Leibfritz et al. 1997).22  
(iii) Political feasibility – Profeta (2003) introduces more than one caveat concerning the 
political feasibility of a the tax shift by an amount of about six point of GDP. This is probably 
still more true if the shift almost entirely goers from dependent workers to all the consumers 
(and producers). Some parts of the workers’ contributions to their PAYG pension schemes is 
charged on other tax-payers-voters In my mind just one way can make this politically feasi-
ble. It could be done by charging on general taxes the financing of an universal social security 
safety net, that must include also minimum pensions, whose share on the total treatments can 
thus be subtracted from the funding through workers’ social contributions. 
 
 
3.2. Looking for strengthening fiscal and social fairness 
 
From its very beginning, the “old” Welfare economics (obviously: Pigou 1929) clearly stated 
that the level of social welfare is given not just by the amount but also by the even distribution 
of the social “dividend” (= GDP), due to the principle of decreasing marginal utility. Thus it 
seems worthwhile to look for an increase in fiscal and social fairness to sustain the welfare 
and compensate the current decrease of the growth rate. Something like a Rawlsian society 
(Rawls 2001) is outlined in the background, i.e. the well ordered society of equal opportuni-
ties, highly endowed with freedom and social justice, particularly for the less advantaged. 
How to link tax reforms to fiscal and social fairness? The main way obviously requires to im-
prove tax equity, some other features of tax systems are involved, having however well in 
mind that some final and maybe far more important traits of social fairness have little to do 
with fiscal systems. Looking of course only at these latter, here I limit myself to briefly specu-
lating on three main points, and just in an intuitive way. 
(i) Political process and fiscal exchange - Rawls (still 2001) stated some normative 
conditions, which can allow the political process to generate fair social outcomes. These  
 
 
                                                 
22 The two sets of results may seem asymmetric, but one must take account of the non- linearities and the substi-
tution effects embodied in the model. 
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however seem not likely to occur, according to Profeta’s findings. Is it always the case? It is 
not lacking a vein of literature which stresses that interest groups’ pressure may decrease dur-
ing emergency times (e.g. Drazen and Grilli 1993).23 Secondly, the “old” “Public choice” fre-
quently argued that radical reforms, which deeply redistribute property rights, can go further 
than piecemeal and uncompensated cutting of single rents (e.g. Buchanan 1980). 
Anyway the political process on taxation should be not just legitimated but also perfectly 
transparent. I stress this apparent obvious point (the real and not just only formal implementa-
tion of the principle “no taxation without representation”) because we saw that some recent 
European tax reforms were not exactly transparent. Avoiding fiscal illusion is truly important 
to allow citizens to properly evaluate the fairness of fiscal exchange, being rational and well 
informed (further simplification of tax system may help), and also, if possible, somewhat al-
truistic. 
(ii) Taxing rules and social behavior - The structure of tax rules has wide effects on social 
behavior, not just on tax compliance. The latter should obviously be empowered in order to 
make taxation reliable and sure, amnesties should be avoided, evasion and corruption should 
be heavily fought against, tax administration should be efficient and correct with tax-payers. 
Once more I recall obvious textbook features just because they in fact are largely absent in 
European Countries, especially the Mediterranean ones’ (Bovi 2002). The social effects of 
taxing rules are however deeper and far reaching. These rules intervene in the most sensible 
relationship between the state and the citizens. Being well behaved and observed, they induce 
an higher degree of Kantian public ethics which in turn stimulates better educated behaviors, 
more social cohesion, more sound and altruistic preferences. All this is also welfare and it 
might to trigger a virtuous chain reaction with the growth rates. 
(iii) Tax equity - Vertical equity (par. 3.2, over) was not strengthened but if anything 
weakened by recent European tax reforms. Tax progressivity has been largely contrasted by 
alleging both efficiency and ideological arguments. This theoretical and political stance is 
pretty questionable and seems not to compare favorably with the following three arguments. 
Taken together, these arguments should favor the empowering and not the dismantling the 
degree of vertical equity, i.e. of the redistributive purposes of tax system. 
 
 
                                                 
23 One may however doubt if is this really the present state of affairs that (rational and well informed?) European 
citizens at present do perceive.  
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a) It is commonly alleged that redistributive targets can better be reached through the ex-
penditure rather than through the revenue side of the budget (for instance: EU Commission 
2002). But can we credit the underlying calculations? Ultimate demonstrations for an already 
long time have been given (e.g. Goodin and Le Grand 1987) according to which welfare and 
other public services are mostly captured by the middle class. The redistributive impact 
should then be due mainly to social protection and particularly to public pensions, thanks to 
their predominant amount. However the unavoidable suspicion is that these estimates are sin-
gle generation ones, without considering together the effects of PAYG social contributions, 
usually proportional if lower net wages but regressive when passed on prices in non-
competitive markets; 
b) in a world and at a time in which inequality of ex ante incomes is rapidly (and worry-
ingly) increasing (Atkinson 1999b), not to weaken the redistributive effects of taxation seems 
like a suitable and reasonable policy choice; 
c) looking at the results by the most recent theoretical an empirical literature, it turns out 
that standard theory arguments against redistributive policies (i.e. their supposed incentive-
reducing effects with respect to growth) do not seem to hold and perhaps need to be re-
versed.24 Be careful of course to not mistake the general taxation-to-growth effect (see back, 
par. 2.4.1) for the differential impact of redistributive taxation.25 
Vertical equity has also been eroded by the decreased burden on capital incomes due to 
fiscal competition. The Nordic “Dual income tax system” has then been viewed as a good 
compromise between equity and contrasting capital flights (Cnossen 2002). Really it is so 
only under the condition that income and wealth are evenly distributed and highly correlated. 
This may be the case in some countries, but not in all. For the first 1990s Wagstaff et al.  
 
                                                 
24 The conventional OT idea concerning the unavoidable trade-off between equity and efficiency has recently 
been heavily challenged by a large number of empirical analyses. A negative correlation repeatedly was founded 
between inequality and growth. Still more surprisingly, growth rates seem positively influenced by redistributive 
policies, also if performed by increasing tax progressivity. The most convincing theoretical root of these evi-
dences has been found with reference to economies in which wealth and human capital endowments are hetero-
geneous across individuals and capital markets are imperfect. The negative effects of inequality on growth might 
thus depend on: a) the reduction of investment opportunities; b) the worsening of borrowers’ incentives; c) more 
macro-economic volatility (Aghion and Caroli 1999). 
 
25 The standard competitive analysis of labor markets usually considers labor tax progressivity (i.e. the degree of 
substitution effect) conflicting with employment. This result is however generally reversed by unionized markets 
analysis (e.g. Pissarides 1998). 
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(1999) report Gini coefficients on ex ante incomes ranging from 0.25 (Germany) to 0.41 (The 
United Kingdom). Also, an even level of capital income tax rate is required and this the case 
in many European Countries (see back, par. 2.3.2). Just as one example, for the middle 1990s 
Joumard (2001) reports rates on interests ranging from 12.5 per cent (Italy) to 30 per cent 
(Sweden, not surprisingly). 
Horizontal equity seems not much to be at the center of political action. We have already 
discussed a widespread lack of equity in the fiscal treatment of households, with reference to 
the number of both earners and dependents. As to the latter, the modern “welfare view,” re-
stricting the need of allowances only to low-income families, is now contrasted by a renewal 
of the old “optimum size view,” induced by the worries of a European declining population. 
According to this view, allowances should be extended also to the middle-to-high incomes 
and should reach a huge amount in order to work effectively.  
A true fairness further should extend the concept of horizontal equity at least in two direc-
tions. Firstly, the tax system should contribute to make the social justice principle of equal 
opportunities effective. For instance, taxing human capital formation is not only inefficient, 
but it is also unfair. Similarly, inheritance taxes should be empowered and not written off, as 
it is largely occurring. 
Second, the old fashioned qualitative discrimination among incomes (traditionally in fa-
vor of dependent work) should be enlarged and extended to encompass more features, for in-
stance those that can differentiate the social merit of some income and wealth levels.26 Thus 
the market distortions at the individual income levels (due to rents, information failures and 
under evaluation of social value of some activities) should be compensated by the fiscal sys-
tem. For instance, (just Italian?) lawyers and football players should be more taxed, whereas 
less taxes should be charged on teachers and long term care nurses. The same could be said, 
looking also at efficiency targets, by considering the high difference which generally exists 
between labor supply elasticity of men and married women (e.g. Blundell 1992). 
 
 
4. Tax Reforms and the incoming changes within the European institutional 
and policy setting 
                                                 
26 Notice some likeness with Atkinson’s (1996, cap. 15) “Participation Income Scheme,” which was well re-
ceived by 3rd edition (p. 270) of Muller’s “Economics of Welfare”. 
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4.1. Structure and functions of government tiers 
 
EU is now making relevant steps toward becoming a full fledged “Federation,” leaving the 
“Confederation” model behind. The process may be slow-moving but eventual arrival is al-
most certain. This at least has been the common historical experience of existing Federal 
States. The outlining of tax reforms should then show awareness of EU institutional trends 
and not conflicting with them, difficult as they are to be precisely foreseen.27 Due to this un-
certainty, here we will not go beyond a brief discussion of some (personal) broad guesses. 
This somewhat daring aptitude is however necessary to pinpoint a fist (rough and uncertain) 
framework which might serve as a starting reference to begin and not evade a discussion of 
such relevant questions, commonly skirted and left to the speculations of few amateurs of 
European things. 
The EU present institutional setting is made up of no less than five tiers of government: 
Union, National Countries, regions, local governments, the last usually split into counties and 
municipalities. It is very doubtful whether this arrangement could ultimately function, due to 
its huge transactions costs of and the large room for overlaps between upper and lower tiers.28 
A widespread opinion suggests that the national governments will not disappear at all but will 
result in being the losers, overwhelmed by the need to enlarge Union powers and the en-
forcement of subsidiarity’s principle at the lower (regional+ local) tier. 
Apart from some exceptions, the prevailing literature seems to favor an enlargement of 
the EU powers from time to time, provided that Europe government has been made democ-
ratically accountable. Stabilization function has begun a long, difficult and piecemeal shift 
from the states to the Union, but by common consent its present stage of transition is still 
quite unsatisfactory. Allocation function should go beyond current regulatory activities and 
the strengthening of internal market. A largely shared proposal is to gradually extend its role 
in its area of intervention, as to encompass defense, research & development and a European 
transport network.  
                                                 
27 This is also true for the widespread processes of fiscal decentralization which are occurring in many European 
Countries (Gandullia 2003 and OECD 2002b). 
 
28 The figures are far from being reassuring. By considering only present EU Member Countries’, Regional gov-
ernments are in the order of about 150, counties, provinces and departments are about 400, municipalities stay 
well over 100 000, of which the most have less than 10 000 inhabitants (OECD 2002b). It is obvious that some 
restructuring will take place but it is also hard to precisely envisage possible future solutions. 
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The main open question relates to the distribution function, on top of the already existing 
programs of regional development, which however should continue to be in force. A particu-
lar emphasis must indeed be devoted to the recurrent proposal of making EU declared aims of 
social protection really effective, whereas up to now they merely consisted of high-sounding 
statements of rights.29 New pressures to change may arrive by the incoming European Consti-
tution, which most likely will adopt the Tobin’s principle of “Specific Egalitarianism” as en-
dorsed by the Nice 2000 “Charter of European Union’s fundamental rights”.30 
The reason (Atkinson 1992) to put in operation social protection programs also at EU 
level is twofold. Member Countries’ programs suffer from a severe weakness which is made 
evident by the about seventy millions of people (18 per cent of the total) at risk of poverty 
poor who still live in the core Europe. Social benefits reduce the risk but to very different de-
grees, ranging from only about ten per cent (Greece and Italy) to more than 70 per cent 
(Finland), 31 per cent being the European average (Eurostat 2002). Further and connected, 
differences in GDP level and in budget conditions may discriminate one country from the 
other as to their ability to cope with social protection needs. The proposal of a “European 
safety net” targeted to specific countries’ lines of poverty might overcome the otherwise not 
easily solvable dilemma between countries’ or individuals’ targeted plans (still Atkinson 
1992).31 Such a proposal should be strongly welcomed in order to implement our suggestion 
of tax shift from social contributions to consumption tax, particularly VAT. This means that 
                                                 
29 During the 1970s and 1980s EC’s Acts basically took up the 1945 UN “Charter of human rights.” In 1989 the 
”Charter of fundamental social rights” was adopted by the Community (although with the United Kingdom dis-
senting). Its aims were confirmed by the Social protocol annexed to the Maastricht Treaty (United Kingdom still 
dissenting). The central idea was to extend social protection to wider cohorts of beneficiaries and specifically 
target it to fight against poverty. A Social fund was effectively adopted but it was always made up of not more 
than some dozens of ECU/euro millions and mainly devoted to improve workers’ mobility.  
 
30 Specific guarantees are stated regarding the right to: free mandatory education (art. 14); satisfactory, regular 
employment (art.15); getting high protection of health (art.35); being admitted to social protection and services, 
“in case of motherhood, sickness, labor accidents, dependency and old age, besides that in case of loosing the 
job, according to Union’s and national laws” (italics our). 
 
31 Countries’ plans should be preferred if inequality is rooted amongst countries’, individuals’ plans otherwise. 
Available data show a mixed picture not easy to be disentangled. We saw that at the early 1990s Gini on gross 
incomes ranged from about 25 per cent of Germany to about 41 per cent of the United Kingdom. Per capita in-
come at PPPs in 2000 is relative close to an average of something more than 100 (mean figure for EU and US) 
albeit if with some outliers. But the poor Med Countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) have an average figure of 
about near 80 (computations of Cnossen 2002). Number and distance of diverging countries will obviously dra-
matically increase with the arrival of current EU applicants. GDP per head at PPPs ranges from 24 (Bulgaria) to 
82 (Cyprus), 100 being the EU level and about 45 the candidate countries weighted average figure (Eurostat 
2002). 
 19
in any European Country, the “Safety net” should also cover the social security minimum 
pensions that in this way should paid out from general taxation. 
The sharing of the remaining functions between national and local governments will 
probably depend on single countries preferences, traditions, institutions and de facto condi-
tions. Once progressively deprived from stabilization function, national governments will 
probably concentrate on regional and personal distribution, higher educations, law and order, 
national infrastructures, general administration, and, obviously, debt service. Education, 
health, local transport and other services will probably implement the subsidiarity’s principle 
at the level of local governments, but on should always bear in mind that overlaps with con-
straints from, and monitoring by higher tiers will be widespread and not easily managed or 
disentangled. 
 
 
4.2. The financing of EU and of lower levels of government 
 
At the moment EU budget (Laffan 1997) is not (and must not be) higher than 1.27 per cent of 
Union’s GDP, i.e. near about 85 billions of euro. This plentiful amount of money comes from 
custom duties on extra Union imports (about 15 per cent of total resources), a sharing to 
member countries’ VAT (about 35 per cent), and, as to the residual amount (i.e. about 50 per 
cent), from countries’ contributions in accordance with their GDP. About half of these re-
sources are absorbed by agricultural policy alone. One third goes to the so called “Structural 
actions,” i.e. to regional development and other cohesion initiatives. The small rest is dis-
persed among some minor items. Repeatedly during last years, both parliament and commis-
sion proposed some (marginal) budget increases and intra-resources shifts, looking also at the 
incoming arrival of the candidate countries, with an estimated cost of about ten billions of 
euro (e.g. Gretschmann 1998). At the 1999 Berlin Council, any proposal of this kind was re-
jected, including the budget enlargement for new members. National premiers remained stuck 
in their loved funny puzzles of EU budget.32 
This essential information about EU budget allows us to go back to the discussion of tax 
reforms, and integrating this discussion with the previously outlined proposal about the allo-
                                                 
32 The words are by themselves amusing and enlightening: “British correction,” “Rotterdam or gateway effect,” 
“VAT frozen rate” and so forth. 
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cation of functions between government tiers. When (and if) fully implemented, such pro-
posal would require resources near to ten per cent of GDP at the EU level,33 something less 
than 25 per cent at the Nation level, and near about to 15 per cent for local tiers, provided that 
the total amount of public resources would more or less remain at to-day figure. 
Going on with this parable, we can now speculate that EU current resources should be in-
creased up to near three points of GDP. The GDP contribute will cease to be in force but it 
might be more than compensated by attributing to EU level the total revenue accruing from 
VAT on imports from outside the Union itself together with the yields from the (increased) 
environmental levies. The new additional financial tools should be outlined according with 
sound criteria of tax design and fiscal federalism. Our choice is twofold, and seriously takes 
into account the previously outlined requirements about tax reforms being growth and fairness 
enhancing. First, for the working of a government that appears to be so distant from its citi-
zens, a part of new revenues should be highly visible and keep politicians for their use. This 
task may be better performed by a EU VAT rate, that is made explicit to consumers, than by a 
sharing to income tax revenues, which on the contrary is hidden in the withholdings on labor 
incomes. At the moment such withholdings account in fact for three fourth of total tax yield. 
The VAT rate should be set at level that is sufficient to pay out for the “Safety net,” thus giv-
ing further visibility to EU social protection and must add to present national rates. We know 
that this would mean three-to-four points in GDP terms. The second leading principle should 
be to directly attribute to the EU level those taxes that most require highly puzzling (e.g. Keen 
1996; Haufler 1999) coordination, i.e. corporations and income capital taxes. Taking into ac-
count the need to alleviate corporation tax, altogether they could amount to about four per 
cent of GDP and should be set around an even same rate34 (20 to 25 per cent). This rate 
should be applied to any kind of capital incomes (interests, dividends, capital gains) to be per-
ceived though final withholdings. It could realize an acceptable “Dual income tax system,” 
provided that income tax average rate was computed by Wagstaff et al. (1999) to range from 
nine per cent (France) to 33 per cent (Sweden), an average European un-weighted rated being 
at about 15 per cent. 
                                                 
33 This amount is quite close to both US and Canadian figures and could make EU budget adequately exogenous 
macro-shock absorber. 
 
34 The proposal to shift Corporation tax at EU’s level is certainly not new (e.g. Albi et al. 1997) and recently has 
been authoritatively brought in again (Cnossen 2002). 
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The end of the story provides for leaving a reasonably progressive income tax and the 
remaining social contributions at national level, where personal distribution function is con-
centrated. It would be appropriate to add excise duties: their cross border shopping distortions 
might be relevant at the local level, which does not seem to happen in the VAT case (Cnossen 
2002). The circle would be thus closed by allocating to the conglomerate of local tiers present 
VAT, benefit taxes and tariffs (including in the category those on making a business) and on 
immovable property, the last to be substantially augmented in accord with our reform scheme. 
Notice that VAT can be a relatively good tool (at least vs. the possible alternatives) of financ-
ing local (= regional) tiers, to which it may be apportioned on the basis of easy statistical 
clearings in accordance with the amount of within boundaries private consumption. Its wide 
basis further allows to collect higher or lower yield through minor rate changes. Finally the 
basis is evenly enough distributed among regions and thus the need for equalizing transfers is 
lower with respect to other eventual resources (e.g. the German case, see Maffini’s chapter). 
To conclude, notice that this structure of lower tiers financing would be also in line with a 
long theoretical tradition and the main examples of well established Federal States. 
 
 
5. Some conclusions and the need for further research 
 
A work like this raises many questions, gives some answers and open many further problems 
which deserve further research efforts. In my firm opinion, European Countries’ tax reforms 
adopted from the 1990s introduced some improvements, mainly by streamlining existing sys-
tems, but they have been mostly narrow both in size and as to the aims. Sound fiscal choices 
that are targeted at Europe’s should instead be more radical and intended to cope with our 
continent great events and fundamental needs. This, I admit, is a no easy way, nor by now 
well defined. 
Many years of common market, the single market, and then the monetary union, together 
with the harmonization efforts of the (weak) European government, made not the original 
1960s very different tax system converging as required by single market efficiency. Reducing 
remaining differences raises wide political, institutional and national-identity costs. It is not 
clear to which institutions and procedures the task of driving further convergence processes is 
to be assigning.  
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Before any further analysis, basic common sense suggests that (average) tax wedges on 
labor at around 45 per cent and implicit rates over 30 per cent for corporations have some-
thing to do with the European declining growth rate and increasing unemployment. Theoreti-
cal hints and empirical data suggest that tax reforms could help, but only if burden taken off 
from labor and corporate capital can be pushed to a relevant extent if it is to give some size-
able advantages. How to finance such huge tax-cuts is the subsequent puzzle. 
The Stability Pact prevents the reduction of fiscal pressure and takes in any workable ex-
penditure cuts, if not those which heavily would roll back the welfare state. Thus the escape 
route necessarily involves shifting the tax burden, from labor (social contributions, mainly 
those of employers) and corporations to rents, environmental externalities and, mainly, con-
sumption (VAT). Theory and evidence are in fact not thoroughly reassuring about this policy 
while political economy predictions warn us to beware of an its no easy electoral feasibility. 
To climb over this last obstacle, I propose that the heavier consumption taxes shoud fund an 
universal social security safety net, which also encompasses minimum pensions treatments. 
In a world where growth rates decline, one is forced to find an additional source of wel-
fare by increasing social fairness, to which fiscal fairness may contribute. Firstly, through a 
legitimated and transparent political process of tax voting, secondly by establishing an equita-
ble fiscal exchange and well behaved tax rules between state and citizens, finally through the 
most familiar channels of vertical and horizontal equity. The both have to be empowered and 
enlarged to better contribute to the society of pair opportunities. This direction of reform 
should get a general approval, but in fact it might raise a long list of ideological and vested in-
terest oppositions. 
European Countries should be aware that present tax reforms are to be applied in dra-
matically changing institutional setting. We can just (but must) speculate on the main (and 
uncertain) consequences. It is indeed necessary to have tentative frame within which one can 
discuss such relevant issues, being however aware that the overall effective scenario might be 
largely different and its moves could come very slowly in the time. 
EU central functions will probably increase: here it is suggested that the financing should 
come partly from a transparent tax such as an (additional in our scheme) EU VAT rate which 
is visible to consumers (and better than a sharing to income tax revenues, which on the con-
trary is largely hidden in the withholdings on labor incomes). The remaining amount of fi-
nancing can be found by attributing to the Union level both environmental levies and the two 
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taxes which need more coordination, this being however particularly difficult, i.e. taxation on 
corporate and income capital at about a same and even rate.  
National tiers should be the center of the distributional function and herein the financing 
should be assured particularly by a progressive income tax and by the remaining social con-
tributions, plus excise duties, due to their relevant cross-border shopping distortion, when ap-
plied to lover tiers. In accordance with the subsidiarity’s principles, many services may be 
scaled down to the conglomerate of local governments, where the best eligible candidates to 
build the tax systems are present VAT, increased taxes on immovable property, benefit and 
making a business taxes. Such choice is consistent with, also at the light of traditional theory 
of taxation and closely resembles main examples coming from the most established Federal 
States. 
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